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How can econophysics contribute to economics? Since the relation between basic
principles of physics and economics is not established, there is no reason why physical
theories should be of any value for economic theory. While economic theories leave
the physicists largely without orientation in this field, econo-physicists should orient
themselves at concrete problems from economic practice rather than from economic
academics. Thereby physicists should respect the lead of economists. This then also
puts physics closer to econometrics. Then the natural strength of physics in dealing
with empirical data as the fundamental basis for its research could be valuable for both,
theory as well as for applications in economics.
The term Econophysics was coined by E. Stanley to give a name to a recently born aca-
demic area whose concern is to apply methods and tools from statistical physics, particularly
the more general theory of multi particle systems, and the theory of complex systems to
economic data, including non-equilibrium concepts due to turbulence and multifractality.
Typical objects of econophysics are statistical properties of price fluctuations, correlations,
or the scaling behavior of distributions. Main emphasis is on empirical data. ”A new field
- econophysics - opened with the expectations that the proven methods of the physical
sciences and the newly born science of complex systems could be applied with benefit to
economics. .. ; while the scope of classical econometrics is limited to dynamical models of
time series, econophysics uses all tools of statistical physics and complex systems analysis,
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including the theory of interacting multi agent systems.” (Focardi & Fabozzi, 2004). For
overviews about related concepts and results see the monographs by Mantegna and Stanley
(2000), Bouchaud and Potters (2000), Paul and Baschnagel (2000), and Voit (2005).
From a theoretical viewpoint, the ’merger of economics and physics’, as suggested by the
term ’econophysics’, would benefit if basic principles of the two sciences could be shown to
be intimately linked with each other. Without uncovering or establishing a close relationship
between ’fundamental principles’ of physics and economics, respectively, the relation is left
to the level of verbal and metaphorical analogies. like ’the center of gravity’. This already
raises a first serious problem: While physics have revealed sound First Principles, the collec-
tion of First Principles of economics and their formulation might not be beyond controversy
between different schools of thought in economics. Hence, which principles should be con-
sidered? In the following I will mention two examples, one is the possible relation between
principle of utility maximization and the Principle of Least Action, while the other one
concerns the concept of Entropy which may be related to the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
The Hamiltonian principle of Least Action is at the very bottom of physics. In economic
terms it might be rephrased as: ’Among all possible trading processes those are realized
for which the corresponding time aggregated value process has an extremum.’ This, in fact,
sounds similar to the idea that trading activities are governed by the investors’ goals to max-
imize their utility over some period. A conjecture therefore is that the principles of Least
Action and Utility Maximization are intimately linked to each other. Another topic that
might serve to establish a closer relation between both disciplines concerns the term entropy
which, roughly speaking, might be regarded as a measure for uncertainty. According to this
viewpoint, trading activities are such that uncertainty is maximized since otherwise, if there
would be some piece of information on the market, it would be used for profit and hence
will be removed. This analogy would link the Principle of Maximum Entropy or, equiva-
lently of Minimal Information to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, see Gulko (1999). While
this verbal analogy sounds promising, it has serious conceptual problems: While in a closed
thermodynamic system, entropy approaches its maximum, it is not clear that a market is
a closed system. Even more, besides the Shannon-Weaver Entropy, in physics called the
Boltzmann-Gibbs Entropy, there are other entropy measures due to A. Renyi or E. Tsallis.
The question therefore is about which entropy measure is appropriate for a financial market,
if any of these. On the other hand, the principle of maximum entropy applied to prices ap-
pears to give a a promising alternative to option pricing, given that there is some agreement
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about which entropy is adequate (Buchen & Kelly (1994)). Nonetheless the general question
whether entropy and related concepts play a role in economic systems compatible to their
role in physical systems remains open, but, in my opinion, deserves careful further attention.
Physics and economy have diffenent cultural roots. Economics has evolved not from a
natural science rather than from social sciences through a line of deep intuitions into dif-
ferent and sometime mutually contradictory schools of thought. Therefore, ’econophysics’
is not an interdisciplinary field rather than should be regarded as a transcultural hybrid.
This also becomes obvious if one looks at the respective aims of the two disciplines: While
physics aims to understand the dynamics of a system, economics seems to be more inter-
ested in developing applications, from the development and pricing of financial instruments
to questions concerning management and political issues. In this respect, economics is closer
to engineering sciences. A better understanding of the economic system under consideration
might be helpful for inventing good applications, but for various purposes a good description
suffices. If so then there is no need for an explanatory model. This is what econometrics
gains its high reputation in economics for.
Interestingly the relation of economics and empirical data has been a problematic one for
quite a long time. Empirical research on price fluctuations tracing back to Louis Bachelier’s
work in 1900, such as work by Holbrook Working (1934), Alfred Cowles (1933,1937), and
Maurice G. Kendall (1953), was largely ignored by the economic community for about 60 (!)
years. As the distinguished Cambridge economist N. Kaldor (1972) put it: ” In economics,
observations which contradict the basic hypotheses of the prevailing theory are generally ig-
nored. ... And where empirical material is bought into conjunction with a theoretic model,
as in econometrics, the role of empirical estimation is to illustrate or to decorate the theory,
not to provide support to the basic hypothesis.” Physics as an empirically based science
therefore did not have any place in economics in these times.
This is different with mathematics. Since about 1950 economic thinking has become
dominated by mathematical reasoning originating from Arrow and Debreu’s General Equi-
librium Theory. As indicated by the subtitle, the aim of the Theory of Value is to explain
prices in the sense of logically deducing statements from a minimal set of assumptions - re-
garded as axioms. It should be noted that mathematics is concerned with consistency of
formal statements rather than with empirical ’truth’ , i.e. the match between a theory or a
model and empirical data. Consequently research in these times was exclusively concerned
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with clarifying minimum requirements in terms of ”basic assumptions” rather than with
empirical investigations about the reliability of the assumptions or the relevance of results
in relation to actual prices. The following citation by A. Einstein (1954) may throw a spot-
light on the different perspectives of economics and physics: Given a set of axioms, ... the
skeptic will say: ’it may well be true that a system of equations is reasonable from a logical
standpoint. But it does not prove that it corresponds to nature’. Your are right, dear skeptic.
Experience alone can decide on truth
Data appear to be a natural field in which physics can find its place being valuable for
economics by testing the reliability of a model and its assumptions as well as by comparing
its predictions with empirical data. The point here is that the multiplicity of theoretical
models in economics leaves the physicist without clear orientation. In the following I will
consider only three prominent economic examples: the General Equilibrium Theory, the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the Black and Scholes model for option pricing.
’A theory must have predictive power and has to be falsifiable.’ From this point of view
the General Equilibrium Theory appears to be weak. The theory actually boils down to the
statement that the excess demand is a continuous vector field on a smooth manifold of prices
(this is actually the Walras law) obeying some additional boundedness conditions. Without
strong additional but economically implausible constraints there is typically a set of equi-
libria (Hildenbrand and Kirman, 1988). Since this theory is essentially static, no statement
is involved about which of these equilibria is selected during dynamics. Furthermore, the
vector field representing the excess demand, can be continuously deformed such that an ar-
bitrary equilibrium price (singular point of the vector field) can be obtained. This has been
actually known since the work by Mantel - and Sonnenschein in the 1970-th under the name:
’Anything Goes Theorems’. Taking all this together, this theory lacks explanatory power
in that it is not falsifiable. An important basic assumption of the theory is that agents are
independent from each other rather than ’interact’. This assumption clearly is unrealistic.
No one will deny that agents’ actions and preferences are not independent from each other.
The physicist should keep in mind that ’interaction’ in economics is more general than only
exchanging ’particles’. It can also mean that the agents’ preferences are not independent
anymore from each other but correlated. Thus, if one allows the economic agents to inter-
act, then, as Fo¨llmer showed, that there might be no market clearing price and hence no
equilibrium price at all. His result (Foellmer, 1974) is essentially borrowed from the field of
interacting particle systems. In the light of this result, empirical facts seriously challenges
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the applicability of this theory from a real world perspective.
An other theory provided by economists some time ago is the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), which is a pillar of Modern Portfolio Theory. This pricing theory relies
essentially on the assumption that investors master uncertainty by considering only the first
two moments of the respective distribution. Investigations of empirical return distributions
even quite some time ago have instead shown that empirical distribution are non Gaussian
rather than exhibit fat tails. Thus rare events are not taken into account by the investment
decisions based on the CAPM. From the Gaussian assumption it moreover follows that only
the first two moments enter the theory. Particularly the β’s are a simple function of the co-
variances which, in this context, are thought to carry essential information about assets and
their risk. Recent investigations of empirical correlation matrices have revealed that they
exhibit many properties that are equal to those of a certain class of random matrices, the
so-called Gaussian Orthogonal Ensemble. This approach traces back to E. Wigner and his
work about the spectra of heavy nuclei. From a statistical point of view therefore empirical
correlation matrices carry only a very small portion of statistically significant ’information’
about the financial market. While in the stylized world of theory and classrooms the CAPM
works nicely, it is of minor value from an empirical, i.e. practical viewpoint.
A third candidate for an economic theory that might provide some orientation for physi-
cists is the option pricing formula provided by the works of Black and Scholes and Merton.
It is esentially based on a ’no-arbitrage’ argument and also assumes, in its standard version,
that the world is Gaussian. This pricing model was celebrated in its beginning for its nor-
mative power, not its explanatory power. It did not explain option prices but gave a rule for
pricing options. As shown by Longstaff and Rubinstein in 1994, for literature see Buchen
& Kelly (1999), market option prices since 1987 are inconsistent with the traditional Black
- Scholes formula. Empirical corrections of the theory had to be included like adjusting
for stochastic volatilities, giving rise to what usually is called the ’volatility smile’. But
recall, the volatility smile simply states that the model is incorrect. However, recent work
by Borland (2002) and others has generalized the standard Black-Scholes model particularly
by considering non-Gaussian distribution. The volatility smile in her theory comes from the
theory itself and thus is not an heuristic correction. Interestingly, the distributions used are
in fact exactly those which maximize the Renyi- and the Tsallis entropy.
In my opinion, (at least most of) economic theories therefore leave the physicist without
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any reliable orientation. What then can a physicist rely on? Without an established relation
between the fundamentals of physics and economics he should prevent himself from recy-
cling successful theories and models from his field. For example, while Ising-like or glassy
systems look appealing to model interacting particle systems, the problem is that one has no
information about, for example, what the nature of the interactions is. Analogies with other
field theories have the danger to stay at a purely verbal or formal level without providing
the opportunity to confront the theory with hard data.
In this situation, I think, a physicist should better stay with data on a purely descrip-
tive level, the aim being to extract regularities from the data. Such properties have been
called Stylized Facts, while physicist might call them ’invariant properties’, since these are
statistical properties that are (almost) invariant under the choice of the market considered.
About stylized facts and a careful discussion also of methods see Cont (2000). The idea is
that these regularities might serve as a basis for first steps towards a theoretical understand-
ing. Unfortunately the collection of stylized facts known today is not sufficient to single out
a unique theoretical basis. An other problem consists in the fact that, unlike to physical
practice, a physicist can not perform sound experiments on a financial market. An experi-
ment, injecting money for example, will irreversibly change the market. Physicists should be
aware of that this fact distinguishes an economic system significantly from (typical) physical
systems. As a consequence repeated experiments under identical conditions are impossible.
Thus he is left to observations. Economists have of course been aware of this fact for a
long time. This might explain economists’ strategy to have given theories, mathematical
statements as well as ’economic stories’ upper priority than data for a long time.
Having a theory in mind has the intrinsic danger to destroy an unbiased view on data.
There is a prominent example from physics itself: The astronomer Kopernikus observed
the trajectories of heavy bodies around the sun. His motivation was to quantitatively show
that the trajectories come from the rotation of Platonian Solids - the sign of an god-given
harmony of the universe. He gave this ’believe’ priority over what he in fact observed and
finally started to manipulate data to make them fit into his view. It was then Newton’s
merit to be able to find his law of gravitation from these ’intentional’ data. In general,
if one has a theory in mind, there is always the danger of selective data collection. The
mismatch between data and expected outcome of a believed theory often is called a ’puzzle’
in economics. But then, how to work with data?
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Proposing a model and then selecting data which fit to the model was already criticized
by Kaldor. Practitioners are aware of many problems and questions arising from the real
world. These questions and concrete problems may serve as guidances for physicists. The
advantage would be that then physicists’ efforts were intimately related to practice, opening
acceptance of their research by economic practice, and, furthermore, could be a step towards
exemplary problem solving. In other words, my proposal is to solve selected problems rather
than to set up formal models. Obviously, if the problem concerns an economic question,
these problem should come from economists and particularly economic practice rather than
from academia. Practitioners thus may be the people from whom physicists can learn what
relevant problems are - from an application’s and also from a theoretical point of view.
In this case, physicists should be honest enough and accept the lead of economists in that
respect. But here comes another problem: The definition of a problem includes the definition
of the methods used to at least discuss the problem. While it is difficult to ’define’ a problem
per se, it is even more difficult to concretely describe a problem in a way such that is it
accessible to a foreign discipline and its methods. It is certainly very hard and requires lot of
patience and mutual respect to work together on formulating questions and finally defining
concrete problems to work on.
Summary
In the last decades, physicists have become attacted by problems rising from economics and
particularly from finance (Farmer, 2005). Without having established the congruence be-
tween basic principles between physics and economics, there is no ’econophysics’ as a sound
scientific area. Econophysics is more than methods and rephrasing successful physical mod-
els in financial terms. The dominance of mathematical modeling and story telling in the
field of economics has often lead to a culture of formal or verbal analogies with minor pre-
dictive power. This style has prevented most of previous economic research from empirical
investigations. Without a sound theoretical fundamental basis in economics and without
elaborated empirical investigations of empirical data, physicists are left without any clear
orientation in this field. I am convinced that both fields can gain a lot from each other while
they have to respect their fundamental differences.
A valuable path for physics in the field of economics might be to solve concrete problems
from economic practice and then to move towards the stage of exemplary problem solving.
This means to give highest priority to empirical data and to a sound formulation of concrete
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problems. These problems should come from practice rather than from economic theory.
This then may open an opportunity for a collaboration which is potentially valuable for both
sides. Recent activities in the field such as the successful Capital Mutual Fund founded by
J.-Ph. Bouchaud and M. Potters show that a careful and deep application of methods and
tools from physics can earn money, while it additionally provides deep insides into directions
of theoretical understanding. This could serve as a hint about a valuable direction to go.
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